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A Nonsettling Defendant's Perspective On
Reasonableness Hearings Under
Washington's 1981 Tort Reform Act
INTRODUCTION
The 1981 Product Liability and Tort Reform Act requires
that when parties enter into a settlement agreement, a hearing
must be held on the issue of the reasonableness of the amount
of the settlement.1 Although the major purpose of the reason-
ableness hearing is to prevent the nonsettling defendant from
having to pay more than her share of damages, current prac-
tices may be defeating this purpose. The following hypotheti-
cal illustrates problems that nonsettling defendants may
encounter when faced with reasonableness hearings.
Attorney Smith represents one of two defendants in a per-
sonal injury/wrongful death action. She has been working
with the codefendant's attorney to develop the expert evidence
that she believes will exonerate their clients. The defense
attorneys agree that even if their clients are not exonerated,
liability should be spread evenly between them as their pock-
ets are about equally deep and there is no evidence implicating
one significantly more than the other. Plaintiff has demanded
two million dollars and has rejected Smith's client's $500,000.00
settlement offer.
A day or two before trial, Smith learns that the other
defendant has settled for $250,000.00, and that the hearing on
1. Act of April 17, 1981, 1981 WASH. LAWS, ch. 27 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE
§ 4.22.060(1)).
EFFET OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. (1) A party prior to entering into a
release, covenant not to sue, covenant not to enforce judgment, or similar
agreement with a claimant shall give five days' written notice of such intent to
all other parties and the court. The court may for good cause authorize a
shorter notice period. The notice shall contain a copy of the proposed
agreement. A hearing shall be held on the issue of the reasonableness of the
amount to be paid with all parties afforded an opportunity to present
evidence. A determination by the court that the amount to be paid is
reasonable must be secured. If an agreement was entered into prior to the
filing of the action, a hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of the amount
paid at the time it was entered into may be held at any time prior to final
judgment upon motion of a party.
The burden of proof regarding the reasonableness of the settlement offer
shall be on the party requesting the settlement.
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the reasonableness of the settlement will be held that very
afternoon. Not having been involved in a reasonableness hear-
ing before, Smith drops her trial preparation to do some quick
research. On the plane to the hearing, she reviews the three
cases,2 law review article,3 and statutes4 found, but finds few
clues about what the reasonableness hearing will be like. One
of the cases,5 however, lists factors that the superior court
judge should consider when ruling on the reasonableness of a
settlement.
At the hearing, the plaintiff's attorney presents evidence
of jury awards and settlements showing that $250,000.00 is a
ball park figure in this type of case. Smith points out that
while $250,000.00 is a ball park figure, it is 50 percent lower
than her client's offer, and the plaintiff has offered no proof of
why it was reasonable to accept the lower offer in the face of a
higher one. Nevertheless, the judge, without articulating her
reasons, issues a ruling stating, "I have examined all the fac-
tors set out by the court in Glover v. Tacoma General Hospi-
tal6 and find that the settlement in this case is reasonable." At
trial, the plaintiff, supported throughout by the settling
defendant, obtains a jury verdict-of ten million dollars.
Attorney Smith and other attorneys representing nonset-
tling defendants at reasonableness hearings face several impor-
tant questions that must be answered if they are to protect
their client's interests. These questions include what kind of
evidence is appropriate for the hearing, whether findings and
conclusions are necesssary, what notice is adequate, what rem-
edies are available if a settlement is collusive, and what effect
the reasonableness hearing will have on the nonsettling
defendant's subsequent trial. Unfortunately, these questions
are not answered by the statute.
The legislature left significant gaps in the statute by not
setting out a definition of reasonableness or delineating proce-
2. Zamora v. Mobil Oil, 104 Wash. 2d 211, 704 P.2d 591 (1985); Glover v. Tacoma
General Hospital, 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983); Pickett v. Stephens-Nelsen, 43
Wash. App. 326, 717 P.2d 277 (1986).
3. Harris, Washington's Unique Approach to Partial Tort Settlements: The
Modified Pro Tanto Credit and the Reasonableness Hearing Requirement, 20 GONZ. L.
REV. 69 (1985) [hereinafter Harris]. Upon analysis, this article seems to favor settling
parties, especially plaintiffs, in that the author's conclusions consistently support
plaintiff's interests at the cost of those of nonsettling defendants.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § § 4.22.040, 4.22.060 (1987).
5. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 717, 658 P.2d at 1236.
6. 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983).
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dures for the hearings.7 And because reasonableness hearings
are a relatively recent addition to settlement procedures in
Washington, the discussion in judicial opinions that will even-
tually fill the gaps is so far incomplete. As a result, many
issues raised by reasonableness hearings have not been fully
aired, or even identified. The attorney who has no experience
with reasonableness hearings must grope her way along in
very dim light-a distinct disadvantage when the attorney may
be called upon to attack a settlement's reasonableness on just a
few hours' notice.'
The legislative history of the reasonableness hearing stat-
ute shows that fairness concerns inspired the creation of rea-
sonableness hearings:
There is a legitimate concern that claimants will enter into"sweetheart" releases with certain favored parties. To
address this problem, the section requires that the amount
paid for the release must be reasonable at the time the
release was entered into. Furthermore, it requires parties
desiring to enter into such releases to give five days' notice
to all other parties of the terms of the release.9
Because the reasonableness hearing exists as a filter to block
collusive settlements ("sweetheart releases"), the hearing
must, by its form, provide meaningful exploration of collusion
issues. However, as the hypothetical illustrates, "meaningful
exploration" is not necessarily a practical reality.
The materials written about reasonableness hearings
evoke the image of a conversation between settling parties and
nonsettling defendants, with the legislature, courts, and com-
mentators speaking for different sides. Much of this material
amplifies the voice of the settling parties and, by contrast,
reduces the nonsettling defendants' voice to a whisper. This
Comment amplifies the nonsettling defendants' voice; for as we
will see, the nonsettling defendant has much to lose at a rea-
sonableness hearing. While the hearing was in large part cre-
ated for her benefit to minimize her losses, existing practices
may be subverting the hearing's purpose.
This Comment addresses the questions that the nonset-
7. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT AND PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL
REPORT (1980), reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE SENATE, 47th Leg.,
1981 Reg. Sess. 617, 636-37 [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
8. See infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
9. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636.
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tling defendant's attorney must answer. Section I sets out the
function of reasonableness hearings in light of the policies the
hearings are intended to further-avoiding collusion between
settling defendants and plaintiffs and equitably apportioning
the financial burden among tortfeasors. Section II examines
the form of reasonableness hearings, including what evidence
should be presented, what standards must be met, and the
need for reviewable findings and conclusions. Section III ana-
lyzes, in terms of constitutional due process, the notice
required by the statute. Section IV considers what remedy
should follow a finding that a settlement is collusive. Section V
examines the relationship between the reasonableness hearing
and the nonsettling defendant's subsequent trial.
I. THE FUNCTION OF THE REASONABLENESS HEARING
To understand the reasonableness hearing's function, we
must look at the hearing in the context of the 1981 Product
Liability and Tort Reform Act.10 This Act established a right
of contribution among joint tortfeasors" and so reversed
Washington's common law rule.'2  The legislature established
the right of contribution to promote judicial economy and fair-
ness to defendants.' 3 However, the Act cuts off the right of
contribution between settling and nonsettling defendants when
10. Act of April 17, 1981, 1981 WASH. LAWS ch. 27 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.060(1)).
11. A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who
are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same
injury, death or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against
all or any of them.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1987).
12. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 635. Before the enactment of the 1981 Product
Liability and Tort Reform Act, the Washington Supreme Court analyzed Washington's
common law rule against contribution in Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack
Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 576 P.2d 388 (1978). The court noted that the policies behind
the doctrines of comparative negligence and contribution were different, even though
both promoted fairness in tort liability. The court held that the statutory adoption of
comparative negligence did not necessitate the court's acceptance of contribution, and
affirmed the common law rule against contribution. Id. at 850, 576 P.2d at 389.
13. The Committee believes that with the creation of the right to contribution
a party defendant will be able to join another party who may be liable for
contribution in the original action under current Civil Rule 14, relating to
third party practice. This means that a defendant will not be bound by the
plaintiff's choice of defendants. It is in the interests of judicial economy to
have all of the liability issues determined in one action. The judge will
naturally continue to have authority to require separate trials as to issues or
parties where justice requires.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636.
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the settlement fails to release the nonsettling defendants. 14
When the nonsettling defendants are not released by the set-
tlement, they receive a credit offsetting any future judgment
against them in the case. 5 This pro tanto credit is set at an
amount equal to the settlement amount, or if the settlement
amount is found to be unreasonably low, the credit is set at an
amount determined by the court to be reasonable.' 6
The legislature adopted the pro tanto credit rule to
encourage settlements.'7 The rule encourages settlements in
two ways. First, the rule encourages defendants to settle by
creating immunity from further litigation for the settling
defendant. Second, the rule encourages plaintiffs to settle by
creating certainty for the releasor about the amount of credit
against a future judgment.'8
In addition to encouraging settlements, the pro tanto
credit rule has the positive effect of apportioning the financial
burden, to a limited extent, among codefendants. However,
14. Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settlement with a
claimant only (a) if the liability of the person against whom contribution is
sought has been extinguished by the settlement and (b) to the extent that the
amount paid in settlement was reasonable at the time of the settlement.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(2) (1987).
Note that a ruling on the reasonableness of the settlement is required to establish
the amount of contribution when a settling defendant obtains the release of a nonset-
ting defendant. In this case, logic dictates that the nonsettling defendant would be
interested in a finding that the settlement was unreasonably high.
Apparently, settling defendants rarely obtain the release of nonsettling defend-
ants. This rarity would explain why the Senate Select Committee Report and Senator
Talmadge's article both omit comments about this aspect of a reasonableness hearing.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7; Talmadge, Washington's Products Liability Act, 5 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1 (1981). Because the section 4.22.040(2) case seems to be rare
and did not seem to concern the proponents of the Act, I will not discuss It further.
15. A release, covenant not to sue, covenant not to enforce judgment, or
similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges
that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any
other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the
claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount
paid pursuant to the agreement unless the amount paid was unreasonable at
the time of the agreement in which case the claim shall be reduced by an
amount determined by the court to be reasonable.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1987); see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636.
16. See supra note 15; see also Harris, supra note 3, at 117.
17. This approach was decided upon in order not to discourage parties from
settling with claimants. It was a concern of the Committee that if a released
party could not be guaranteed that he would not be subject to additional
liability at some point in the future depending upon some comparative fault
apportionment, it would discourage parties from entering into such releases.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636.
18. See Harris, supra note 3, at 88.
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the credit may also have undesirable effects: it may cause the
settling or nonsettling defendant to assume a disproportion-
ately large share of the plaintiff's compensation, and it may
encourage partial settlements at the expense of full.19
In the eyes of the nonsettling defendant, the biggest prob-
lem with a pro tanto credit approach to partial settlements is
the possibility that a collusive agreement between the settling
parties will result in a disproportionately low settlement and a
correspondingly low credit against the judgment.2' When a
partial settlement releases the settling defendant from contri-
bution, the plaintiff may
release one tortfeasor from his fair share of liability and
mulct another instead, from motives of sympathy or spite, or
because it might be easier to collect from one than from the
other .... [The release from contribution affords too much
opportunity for collusion between the plaintiff and the
released tortfeasor against the one not released .... In most
three-party cases, two parties join hands against the third
21
These concerns about collusive settlements shaped the
1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act's treat-
meit of partial settlements.2 This Uniform Act and its prog-
eny were historical references for Washington's 1981 Product
Liability and Tort Reform Act.' Under section 5 of the 1939
Uniform Act, the release of "any tortfeasor [did] not release
him from liability for contribution unless it expressly provided
for a reduction to the extent of the pro rata share of the
released tortfeasor of the injured person's recoverable
damages." 24
Under section 4 of the Uniform Act, a plaintiff could have
the certainty of a pro tanto credit; however, if the plaintiff
chose the pro tanto credit rather than the pro rata share in sec-
19. Id. at 90.
20. Id.; UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsORs Acr § 4 comment, 12 U.L.A. 98
(1955).
21. 12 U.L.A. at 99.
22. Id.
23. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 628.
24. Id. A pro rata share, another device for apportioning damages, equals the total
judgment divided by the total number of joint and several tortfeasors. See Harris,
supra note 3, at 77-78. The pro rata share discouraged collusive settlements. However,
because the pro rata share could not be determined until after trial, plaintiffs had no
idea before trial of how much they were giving up by settling, and were reluctant to
settle at all.
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tion 5, the settling defendant would not be released from con-
tribution. This section discouraged defendants from settling
because "[n]o defendant wants to settle when he remains open
to contribution in an uncertain amount, to be determined on
the basis of a judgment against another in a suit to which he
will not be a party."'
The 1955 revision of the 1939 Act placed a higher priority
on encouraging settlements and a lower priority on avoiding.
collusive settlements.2 It attempted to solve the collusive set-
tlement problem by imposing a good faith requirement.' The
Washington legislature incorporated the idea of a good faith
requirement into the reasonableness requirement of section
4.22.060 of the Revised Code of Washington.'
Seen in the light of this historical context, the reasonable-
ness hearing serves the function of evaluating the good faith,
or noncollusiveness, of a partial settlement.' This view is vali-
dated by the Washington State Senate Judiciary Committee's
report on reasonableness hearing procedures. In this report,
the committee, following the lead of the supreme court,s° rec-
25. 12 U.LA. at 99; Harris, supra note 2, at 80-81.
26. 12 U.L.A. at 100 ("It seems more important not to discourage settlements than
to make an attempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimination by plaintiffs, or
collusion in the suit.").
27. 12 U.LA. at 99 ("The requirement that the release or covenant be given in
good faith gives the court occasion to determine whether the transaction was
collusive...."); see also Harris, supra note 3, at 87 n.55.
28. See Pickett, 43 Wash. App. at 334, 717 P.2d at 282 ("[Tihe good or bad faith of a
settlement is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court (during the
reasonableness hearing] based on the evidence presented by the parties."); see also
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636-37.
29. A finding of reasonableness by the court is intended to prevent
"sweetheart deals" with favored parties. If the settlement amount is found to
be unreasonable, the final award is to be reduced by an amount determined by
the court to be reasonable. This process protects the nonsettling tortfeasors
from incurring financial costs which exceed their proportionate share of
liability.
SENATE JUDICIARY Comm., 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Seas., PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING
REASONABLENESS HEARiNGS UNDER PRODUCT Lhmury AND ToRT REFORM ACT OF
1981 2 (1983) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
For a discussion of the good faith requirement, see Harris, supra note 3, at 92-93.
In California where the good faith requirement was law, the requirement was broader
than was necessary to prevent collusion, and the subjectivity of the requirement
invited abuse and caused judicial consternation. Tech-Bflt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). A requirement of rea-
sonableness seems to limit the scope of inquiry: if a settlement is economically reason-
able it may pass muster in Washington. For more on the standards for reasonableness,
see infra text accompanying notes 44-52.
30. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 716 n.2, 658 P.2d at 1235.
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ommended that the first consideration of a court conducting a
reasonableness hearing should be whether or not the settle-
ment is "fraudulent or collusive." 31
Reasonableness hearings thus have two functions:
(1) avoiding collusion, and (2) equitably apportioning the finan-
cial burden, among tortfeasors. The collusion-avoidance func-
tion requires a hearing on the reasonableness of a settlement
at the time it is entered into, with five days' notice to the par-
ties.3  The equitable-apportionment function requires the
court to determine a reasonable amount for reducing any later
damages awarded' or for establishing the amount of the set-
tling defendant's right to contribution.' If we look at collusive
settlements as creating a disproportionate financial burden
among defendants, then the collusion-avoidance function of
reasonableness hearings also serves the equitable-apportion-
ment function.
II. THE FORM OF THE REASONABLENESS HEARING
The form of a reasonableness hearing includes, for the
purposes of this Comment, the standards for judgment that
affect the content of evidence, the form of evidence allowed,
and the form of judgment; in other words, the need for formal
findings and conclusions. Miscellaneous matters such as the
burden of proof and notice requirements are also included.
31. COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 5.
32. There is a legitimate concern that claimants will enter into "sweetheart"
releases with certain favored parties. To address this problem, the section
requires that the amount paid for the release must be reasonable at the time
the release was entered into. Furthermore, it requires parties desiring to
enter into such releases togive five days' notice to all other parties of the
terms of the release.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636-37.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1987) provides:
A release, covenant not to sue, covenant not to enforce judgment, or
similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges
that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any
other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the
claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount
paid pursuant to the agreement unless the amount paid was unreasonable at
the time of the agreement in which case the claim shall be reduced by an
amount determined by the court to be reasonable.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(2) (1987) provides:
Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settlement with a
claimant only (a) if the liability of the person against whom contribution is
sought has been extinguished by the settlement and (b) to the extent that the
amount paid in settlement was reasonable at the time of the settlement.
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The standards and procedures for determining reasonable-
ness are deliberately minimal. On the matter of standards, the
legislature has stated:
The bill does not establish any standards for determin-
ing whether the amount paid for the release was reasonable
or not. It is felt that the courts can rule on this issue without
specific guidance from the Legislature. The reasonableness
of the release will depend on various factors including the
provable liability of the released parties and the liability lim-
its of the released party's insurance. 35
While standards for evaluating reasonableness were left to
the courts, a recent amendment to section 4.22.060(1) places
the burden of proof of reasonableness on the party requesting
the settlement.' Before this amendment was passed, Seattle
attorney Thomas Harris noted in a lengthy law review article
that the policies of encouraging settlements and promoting full
recovery by plaintiffs dominate all aspects of the 1981 Product
Liability and Tort Reform Act, including the reasonableness
hearing requirement.3 7 Based on this premise, he argued that
the burden of persuasion should be on the nonsettling party; in
other words, the nonsettling party must affirmatively prove
unreasonableness." However, absent statutory language that
the "burden of proof" means anything less than the burden of
going forward and the burden of persuasion, the 1987 burden
of proof amendment must be read as placing fairness to
defendants ahead of encouraging settlements in the policy
hierarchy, at least where reasonableness hearings are
concerned.
The only legislative guidelines for the form of reasonable-
ness hearings exist in section 4.22.060(1) of the Revised Code of
Washington. The statute calls for five days' written notice to
all nonsettling parties of intent to settle, although the notice
requirement may be altered to accommodate "eve of trial" set-
tlements. 39 A copy of the settlement must be included in the
notice. There must be a hearing "on the issue of the reasona-
bleness of the amount to be paid with all parties afforded an
35. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636.
36. 1987 WASH. LAws ch. 212 § 1901(1).
37. Harris, supra note 3, at 167.
38. Id. at 118-20; see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
39. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 637.
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opportunity to present evidence."4 ° There are no further legis-
lative guidelines. However, the courts have slowly begun to
take up the legislative slack.
A. Standards for Reasonableness Hearings
The first case to address standards for reasonableness,
Glover v. Tacoma General Hospital,41 involved multiple
defendants in a medical malpractice suit. All the defendants
except the Hospital reached a joint settlement with the plain-
tiff, who had sued on behalf of her comatose sister.42 The set-
tlement figure was $575,000.00, leaving the Hospital potentially
exposed to a $2.5 million verdict with only $575,000.00 as a pro
tanto credit.43
In an effort to gain a higher credit, the Hospital appealed
the reasonableness ruling. The Hospital argued that to be rea-
sonable, the settlement must reflect the defendants' relative
liability.44 The plaintiff replied that good faith is the only real
test of reasonableness.45 The court found both positions to be
too extreme and adopted a balancing test proposed by an ami-
cus brief.' The factors of the balancing test are as follows:
1. The releasing person's damages;
2. The merits of the releasing person's liability theory;
3. The merits of the released person's defense theory;
4. The released person's relative fault;
5. The risks and expenses of continued litigation;
6. The released person's ability to pay;
7. Any evidence of bad faith, collusion, or fraud;
8. The extent of the releasing person's investigation and
preparation of the case; and
9. The interests of the parties not being released.47
The court held that no one of these factors should control, but
that the trial judge "must have discretion to weigh each caseindividually. '
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1987).
41. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983).
42. Id. at 710, 658 P.2d at 1232.
43. Id. at 711, 658 P.2d at 1232.
44. Id. at 711, 716-17, 658 P.2d at 1232, 1235-36.
45. Id. at 717, 658 P.2d at 1236.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 718, 658 P.2d at 1236. The Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed the
Glover factors in its report. COMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 6. The factors
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The court found three of its balancing test factors in the
record made by the trial judge: "risks of litigation, the lack of
bad faith and the interests of Tacoma General Hospital."'49
While the way in which the trial judge used these factors was
not clear from the record, the supreme court found substantial
evidence to support the finding of reasonableness. This evi-
dence included testimony both about the high risk of plaintiffs
losing at trial and about the substantial amount of settlement,
which was 23 percent of the damages sought.5°
In a later case challenging a reasonableness hearing, the
nonsettling defendant argued that the trial court had erred by
failing to balance all of the Glover factors.5' The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, but did not address
the petitioner's argument. The court of appeals cited Glover
for the principle that "the trial court should not allow any one
factor to control. Rather, the court should use its discretion
and weigh each case individually."'  Even though the Glover
court did not say that fewer than all the factors may be used to
support a finding that a settlement amount is reasonable, the
Glover court in fact used fewer than all its factors to analyze
and affirm the trial court's decision. That is, the court's
actions, not its words, support the proposition that fewer than
all the factors may be used.
Because the burden of proof of reasonableness is now
squarely, by statute, on the head of those seeking the ruling of
reasonableness (the settling parties), and because the courts
have shown a willingness to decide the matter using fewer
than all of the Glover factors, the settling parties may offer
proof of fewer than all of the factors at the reasonableness
hearing. A nonsettling defendant seeking to bring the remain-
ing factors into the discussion would have to introduce proof of
them herself.
We can see how this might work in our hypothetical:
Assume Attorney Smith has had enough time to prepare
for the reasonableness hearing and has discovered that in
order to show that the settlement amount is reasonable the
plaintiff will offer proof only of what other attorneys think the
enumerated in Glover are appropriate for courts to use in determining the
reasonableness of a settlement agreement.
49. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 718, 658 P.2d at 1236.
50. Id.
51. Pickett, 43 Wash. App. at 333, 717 P.2d at 281.
52. Id. at 333, 717 P.2d at 281 (citing Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 718, 658 P.2d at 1236).
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case is worth. In addition to offering proof from other attor-
neys that the case is worth more, Smith could show the follow-
ing: (1) that the available evidence suggests that the plaintiff's
theory of liability is as strong against the settling defendant as
it is against the nonsettling defendant ("merits of the releasing
person's liability theory," "merits of released person's defense
theory," and "interests of the parties not being released");-'
(2) that there is no evidence implicating one defendant more
than another ("released person's relative faults");' 4 (3) that
with the settlement so close to trial, and discovery complete,
the plaintiff has already made a considerable investment in the
case, should have a definite figure for the amount of damages
sought, and should expect a settlement that is realistic in
terms of the damages and amount of time, effort, and money
invested ("the extent of the releasing person's investigation
and preparation of the case");5 (4) that both defendants are
equally solvent and equally accessible for payment ("released
person's ability to pay," "interests of parties not being
released");' and (5) that a settlement with one defendant, in
these circumstances, for half the other defendant's settlement
offer is not only unreasonable, but evidence of "bad faith, col-
lusion, or fraud.
57
Arguably, going forward with evidence of this type is
much like assuming the burden of persuasion of nonreason-
ableness after the proponent has offered proof of reasonable-
ness. However, under the burden of proof amendment, the
proponent of reasonableness now must make some offer of
proof; the rule suggested by Harris created, in effect, a rebut-
table presumption of reasonableness to the proponent's
advantage.
Finally, two comments that may affect a nonsettling
defendant's decision about evidence strategies at a reasonable-
ness hearing. First, attorneys for nonsettling defendants are in
an awkward position at reasonableness hearings. At this point,
the client's interest is to have the highest amount possible set
as a reasonable settlement because with the pro tanto credit,
the higher the amount set as a reasonable settlement, the less
the nonsettling defendant will pay after judgment. However,







to argue for a high settlement amount at a reasonableness
hearing undermines the nonsettling defendant's trial and set-
tlement negotiation strategy, which is to convince all con-
cerned that the case is worth as little as possible. To establish
credibility and secure the most favorable procedures, nonset-
thing defendants would do well to consider carefully their opin-
ions about a case's worth and avoid assertions of worth that
seem extreme in either direction.
Second, in the hypothetical, Smith's position is sympa-
thetic because of her client's high settlement offer. However,
where a nonsettling defendant has refused to negotiate or has
made offers considerably lower than those of the settling
defendant, the nonsettling defendant will not be seen in such a
sympathetic light unless the other factors can be balanced in
her favor.
B. Evidence
We have discussed the general content of evidence that
must be offered by parties to a reasonableness hearing. The
obvious next question is, what form does this evidence take?
Apparently the forms of proof vary from court to court.
This was a source of concern to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, which found mini-trials used in some jurisdictions, affida-
vit evidence in others, and in still others reasonableness orders
issued on agreement without a hearing.58
In its report, the Senate Judiciary Committee recom-
58. Individuals involved in a tort action who decide to enter into a settlement
agreement ought to have a reasonable expectation of being treated the same
regardless of the county in which the trial is held. A fundamental concept of
law is that all persons should be treated equally. However, at the present
time litigants are being treated differently, depending on the county where
the action is brought.
[W]hile in many cases, reasonableness orders are entered on agreement of
the parties, some courts are actually conducting mini-trials on the issue of
reasonableness and requiring in-court testimony. Other courts are handling
the reasonableness hearings through affidavits. This situation creates
tremendous procedural problems for attorneys and litigants since often times
the parties are not assigned a judge until the day of the hearing.
The lack of uniformity in conducting reasonableness hearings is creating
confusion and uncertainty for judges, attorneys and litigants. The public
policy of the state is to encourage settlement agreements and avoid
unnecessary court delay and congestion. The lack of uniformity in conducting
reasonablenss hearings is frustrating the public policy of the state.
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 4-5.
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mended that evidence at reasonableness hearings be presented
by affidavit "unless the court specifically determines that testi-
mony is required in the interest of fairness to all the parties in
the action."'59 The committee's recommendation for affidavit
evidence when there are no complications calls to mind CR 56,
the civil rule regarding summary judgment.' Indeed, CR 56
appears to be a good model for most reasonableness hearing
procedures. Under CR 56, a party may move for summary
judgment with or without supporting affidavits. 61 The party
opposing the motion has an opportunity to present opposing
affidavits, and where there are no disputed issues of material
fact based on the preliminary affidavits, a ruling is made on
the applicable law. 2 CR 56 permits depositions and interroga-
tories to supplement affidavits6 and allows for continuance
where an opposing party shows insufficient time to prepare
59. Id. at 6.
60. (a) FOR CLAIMANT. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim, or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any
time after the expiration of the period within which the defendant is required
to appear, or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS. The motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party, prior to the day of
the hearing, may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
WASH. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c).
61. Id.
62. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.
WASH. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
63. (e) FORM OF AFFIDAVITS; FURTHER TESTIMONY; DEFENSE REQUIRED.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits.
WASH. R. Civ. P. 56 (e)
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adequate proof.64
CR 56(e) gives the party opposing the motion the burden
to go forward with contradictory evidence if the moving party
supports the motion with proof.6 5 Practically, this requirement
applies even with the new burden of proof amendment for rea-
sonableness hearings." This amendment affects the analogy
between summary judgments and reasonableness hearings on
the issue of proof by making the proponent's offer of proof
mandatory. 7
Reasonableness hearings may also present some problems
under the evidence rules. These problems will arise when the
nonsettling party seeks to discover any terms that may not be
disclosed in the written settlement agreement and that may be
potentially harmful to her case. For instance, perplexed by
plaintiff's refusal of her client's higher offer, Attorney Smith
may suspect that the settling defendant has agreed to help the
plaintiff win his case against Smith's client. This help could
take the form of disclosing weaknesses in Smith's client's
case-the kind of weaknesses defense attorneys know exist but
which they pray plaintiff's attorney will never discover.68
64. (f) WHEN AFFIDAVITS ARE UNAVAILABLE. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated,
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
WASH. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
65. See supra note 62. The Washington Court of Appeals noted in Pickett before
the passage of the burden of proof amendment:
We see a similarity between a reasonableness hearing and a motion for
summary judgment where the moving party has the initial burden of proof.
Once the moving party proves by uncontroverted facts that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Pickett, 43 Wash. App. at 333 n.2, 717 P.2d at 281 n.2. See also id. at 332, 717 P.2d at 281
("It is incumbent upon a party having a significant interest in seeing that the settle-
ment is found to be unreasonable to present some evidence to controvert the settling
parties' evidence.").
66. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text; see also supra text
accompanying notes 57-58.
67. Id.
68. Note that serious ethical questions may arise when the attorneys for
codefendants work together in preparing a defense. Arguably the cooperation could be
construed as dual representation, triggering RPC 1.7(a).
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the
other client; and (2) each-client consents in writing after consultation and a
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To ascertain if there are undisclosed settlement terms,
Smith attempts to depose the attorneys for the settling parties.
The attorneys reply that that information is privileged. May
the settling parties legitimately claim that settlement terms,
undisclosed in the settlement agreement, are privileged? A
closer examination of the settlement process and of the attor-
ney-client privilege indicates that they may not.
The attorney-client privilege is governed by statute. 9 Fur-
ther, the privilege applies only to confidential communications
between attorney and client.70 The privilege is lost when those
communications involve a third party with whom there is no
attorney-client relationship.71  Settlement negotiations neces-
sarily include at least two sets of attorneys and clients, each set
third parties to the other set. Thus, any terms agreed upon
during settlement negotiations cannot be considered confiden-
tial communications between the attorney and client, and are
not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
7 2
Settlement terms are required by law to be disclosed to
full disclosure of the material facts (following authorization from the other
client to make such a disclosure).
WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT, Rule 1.7(a) (1987).
While disclosure and written consent to the cooperative representation may. be
time consuming and awkward, it is ultimately in the defendants' interest that coopera-
tion by their attorneys constitutes dual representation. Once the attorneys are seen as
representing both clients, the nonsettling defendant may have at least some minimal
protection later on if the plaintiff tries to trade a release for defense confidences or
secrets. This protection comes from RPC 1.9.
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(b) Use confidences or secrets relating to the representation to the disadvan-
tage of the former client ....
WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9 (1987).
Applying this analysis to the reasonableness hearing context, we can see that once
there has been dual (cooperative) representation, the settling defendants' attorney
risks discipline if she reveals to the plaintiff any confidences or secrets of the nonset-
thing defendant.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (1987) provides: "An attorney or counselor
shall not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment."
70. See supra note 69; see also State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394
P.2d 681 (1964); K. TEGLAND, 5 WASH. PRAC. Evidence § § 171, 372.
71. Sowers, 64 Wash. 2d at 832, 394 P.2d at 683-84.
72. While not privileged, and therefore discoverable, the admissibility of
settlement terms at trial is limited by WASH. R. EVID. 408. See infra notes 160-68 and
accompanying text.
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nonsettling defendants and to the court.73 Because settlement
terms must, by law, be shared with other than the settling par-
ties, the law would be undermined if the attorney-client privi-
lege was used to protect some terms from discovery merely
because they were not disclosed in the formal settlement
agreement.74
C. Findings and Conclusions
Although summary judgment procedures provide a good
model for reasonableness hearing procedures, one aspect of CR
56 should not apply to reasonableness hearings: an exemption
from formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.75 To aid
appellate review and prevent judges from "rubber-stamping"
settlement agreements, judges must articulate for the record
the factors supporting a determination of reasonableness.
Additionally, their determination of reasonableness should be
fully reviewable as a question of law.
In Glover, the court said that to aid appellate review, trial
judges "should enunciate those factors which lead them to con-
clude that a settlement is reasonable.78 This sounds like a
requirement for at least an articulation of those factors on the
record, if not a requirement of formal findings of fact and con-
73. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1987) requires that a copy of the proposed
settlement be sent "to all other parties and the court." The disclosure of settlement
terms must be required under the reasonableness hearing statute to facilitate the
inquiry into the reasonableness of the settlement and to protect nonsettling defendants
from collusion.
74. Some attorneys may feel that even affidavit or deposition testimony would be
improper testimony under RPC 3.7: "A lawyer shall not act as advocate at trial in
which the lawyer or another lawyer in the same law firm is likely to be a necessary
witness." However, RPC 3.7(c) would be usable at a reasonableness hearing, the above
rule applies except where "the lawyer has been called by the opposing party and the
court rules that the lawyer may continue to act as an advocate." WASH. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.7 (1987). See also WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 (1987) (lawyer may reveal information relating to representation of
client if disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out representation).
75. (1) Generally. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law.
(5) When Unnecessary. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are not
necessary:
(B) Decision on Motions. On decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 ....
WASH. R. CIv. P. 52(a)(1),(5)(B) (emphasis added).
76. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 718, 658 P.2d at 1236.
742 University of Puget Sound Law Review
clusions of law.17 A clear statement of the trial judge's reason-
ing is necessary to show an appellate court that the trial judge
did use discretion 7' and to provide a key to further articulation
of a reasonable settlement standard.79
Harris recommends that Glover should not be read as
requiring the entry of formal findings of fact.' He cites
"analogous judicial decisions, Wash. R. Civ. Proc. 52, and a
closer review of Glover" as the basis of this conclusory recom-
mendation, without referring to the specific statements on
which his analysis was based. Thus Harris provides a perfect
example of why detailed findings are necessary."'
Harris argues further that "there is no reason for making
the final order for reasonableness hearings any more formal
than those required for summary judgment decisions."8' 2
Because summary judgment decisions specifically do not
require formal findings and conclusions, 3 Harris argues that
rulings on reasonableness should not require formal findings
and conclusions. Not only is this reasoning circular, it ignores
the nature of summary judgment motions.
A summary judgment motion may be granted only when
there are no genuine issues of material fact,' making judicial
fact-finding unnecessary. At a reasonableness hearing, how-
ever, there may be genuine issues of material fact, such as the
existence of collusive settlement terms, or the amount the case
is worth.' The Glover factors all require factual determina-
tions that must precede the balancing and legal determination
of reasonableness." All of the facts underlying the Glover fac-
tors are open to contest. Formal findings of fact should be
required to help trial court judges resist any temptation to rub-
ber-stamp settlement agreements, and to aid in the appellate
review of determinations of reasonableness.
77. Id.
78. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.2:536-37
(19F5).
79. Id.
80. Harris, supra note 3, at 150-51.
81. Id. at 151.
82. Id.
83. WASH. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(5)(B); see supra note 75.
84. WASH. R. Civ. P. 56(b); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030
(1982).
85. See Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash. 2d 491, 519 P.2d 7 (1974) (a material fact is one
on which the outcome of the litigation depends).
86. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 718, 658 P.2d at 1236 ("[W]e note that the finding of
reasonableness necessarily involves factual determinations.").
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The problem of findings and conclusions at a reasonable-
ness hearing is analogous to the problem of findings and con-
clusions required of a decision to admit prior conviction
evidence to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant
under ER 609. Like the creation of contribution rights under
the Product Liability and Tort Reform Act of 1981, ER 609 was
a major departure from the common law rule that automati-
cally allowed the admission of prior conviction evidence. 7 ER
609 allows the use of prior conviction evidence only in limited
circumstances." After the adoption of ER 609, trial court
judges apparently paid mere lip service to its requirements and
let in prior conviction evidence in spite of the rule. 9 Finally,
in State v. Jones, the Washington Supreme Court insisted that
the balancing test for admitting prior conviction evidence must
be used responsibly and must be articulated on the record to
aid appellate review.'
Like ER 609, contribution rights were a significant depar-
ture from the common law in Washington. In joint and sev-
eral liability cases under the common law, contribution was
disallowed.9 This rule was justified by the policy that joint
tortfeasors, as wrongdoers, should not have access to the
courts.92 With this rule and policy so recently a part of Wash-
ington law, there is a danger that trial court judges may show a
bias against joint tortfeasors by rubber-stamping settlement
agreements, thereby denying the nonsettling party the more
87. See, e.g., State v. Nass, 76 Wash. 2d 368, 371. 456 P.2d 347, 349 (1969).
88. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the
law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
WASH. R. EvID. 609 (a).
89. See State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 676 P.2d 975 (1984); State v. Jones, 101
Wash. 2d 113, 677 P.2d 131 (1984); State v. Pam, 98 Wash. 2d 748, 659 P.2d 454 (1983);
State v. Alexis, 95 Wash. 2d 15, 621 P.2d 1269 (1980); State v. Thompson, 95 Wash. 2d
888, 632 P.2d 50 (1981).
90. Jones, 101 Wash. 2d at 122, 677 P.2d at 137.
91. Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 576 P.2d
388 (1978) (adoption of comparative negligence did not necessarily require adoption of
contribution among joint tort-feasors. and rule prohibiting contribution remained the
law).
92. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 628.
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equitable apportionment of a higher "reasonable" release or a
remedy appropriate for collusion.
Because this major policy change regarding joint
tortfeasors in Washington is so new, and because it demands
more of a judge's time, some trial courts may try to avoid more
than a cursory look at a settlement during a reasonableness
hearing. To encourage all trial courts to take a serious look at
the arguments about the reasonableness, or alternatively, the
collusiveness of a settlement, we must take seriously the
court's dictum in Glover about enunciating the factors that
support a judgment of reasonableness.93 A formal and respon-
sible analysis of fact and factor should be performed on the
record. The requirement of formal findings and conclusions in
support of a reasonableness ruling would be a step towards
responsible trial court consideration of both the settlement
agreement and the arguments of the nonsettling parties. 4
A further step in this direction would be to treat the bal-
ancing of the factors, and thus the ultimate decision on reason-
ableness, as a question of law fully reviewable by an appellate
court.95 Harris reaches a contrary conclusion, stating, "The
proper rule is that any tort decision regarding reasonableness,
even when made in a non-jury setting, should be sustained as
long as there is substantial evidence supporting the decision. " '
The cases cited in support of this statement uphold findings on
negligence-whether or not a person acted reasonably. Harris
asserts that "[r]easonableness hearing determinations are
directly analogous to fully litigated, non-jury tort cases in
which the court determines whether a person acted
reasonably."'
These determinations are analogous in the sense that both
are "objective" determinations. However, there is a conspicu-
ous difference between a ruling on the reasonableness of a per-
93. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 718, 658 P.2d at 1236.
94. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.2:537
(1985).
95. This is consistent with the use of summary judgment practice and procedure
as a model for reasonableness hearings. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court engages in the same inquiry as
the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030, 1031 (1982).
But see cases cited supra notes 89-90, in which decisions made under the
somewhat analogous balancing process of WASH. R. EVID. 609 are reviewed only for
abuse of discretion, a highly deferential standard.
96. Harris, supra note 3, at 149.
97. Id. at 149 n.281.
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son's acts in the context of negligence and a ruling on the
reasonableness of a settlement. In the context of negligence,
the court must decide whether certain behavior fell short of
what a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances
would do. The standard of reference is fairly broad and is
based on ordinary, day-to-day experience. The ruling on the
reasonableness of a settlement under Glover is quite different.
Rather than drawing on common cultural experiences to
define reasonableness, the Glover factors focus on a much nar-
rower legal context.9" Such factors as the merits of the legal
theories of the settling parties, the risks of continued litigation,
and the extent of discovery must be judged from experience in
the legal system.
Not only is "reasonableness" at a reasonableness hearing
unlike reasonableness in the context of negligence, the contest
over reasonableness at reasonableness hearings will probably
wax hottest over legal conclusions rather than facts--that is,
whether or not, given the state of the case, a particular settle-
ment is reasonable as a matter of law.
Conclusions of law are fully reviewable with minimal def-
erence to the trial court's decision." Because the legal ques-
tion dominates a reasonableness hearing," the trial court's
answer should not be treated deferentially: the trial court is in
98. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 717-18, 658 P.2d at 1236.
99. See Leschi v. Highway Corn'n, 84 Wash. 2d 271, 286, 525 P.2d 774, 785 (1974); J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 13.4:600 (1985).
Findings of fact, unlike conclusions of law, are treated deferentially, with review
limited to whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Peeples v. Port of
Bellingham, 93 Wash. 2d 766, 771, 613 P.2d 1128, 1132 (1980), revd on other grounds,
Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wash. 2d 853, 676 P.2d 431 (1984); Maehren v. Seattle, 92 Wash.
2d 480, 486, 599 P.2d 1255, 1260 (1979), cert denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). The greater
deference to findings of fact is based on
the theory that there is a conflict in the testimony and that the trial court,
having the witnesses before it, is in a better position to arrive at the truth
than is the appellate court. For this reason, the rule has no application in a
case where there is no substantial dispute as to the facts and no question as to
the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony, but
where the sole question on appeal concerns the proper conclusions to be
drawn from practically undisputed evidence, in such situation [sic], this court
has the duty of determining for itself the right and proper conclusions to be
drawn from the evidence in this case.
Peeples, 93 Wash. 2d at 772, 613 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Shultes v. Halpin, 33 Wash. 2d
294, 306, 205 P.2d 1201, 1207 (1949)).
100. Harris admits the relative unimportance of demeanor evidence and the lesser
degree of fact finding at a reasonableness hearing-
The trial court is not performing the same refined dollars-and-cents task that
is performed by the trier of fact in a trial on the merits. For that reason,
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no better position to answer the legal question than is the
appellate court.''
In addition to practical reasons for nondeferential review
of a trial court's pre-trial ruling on the reasonableness of a set-
tlement, policy reasons dictate nondeferential review. Well-
defined standards for reasonableness are crucial to all parties.
The greater the clarity of the standard by which reasonable-
ness is judged, the more likely that the settling parties' agree-
ment will fall within that standard and in the long run reduce
litigation. In addition to encouraging responsible analysis,
nondeferential review will hasten the definition of reasonable-
ness by creating opportunities for appellate decisions that
authoritatively balance the Glover factors.
III. NOTICE
The following notice requirements are set out in the rea-
-sonableness hearing statute:
A party prior to entering into a release, covenant not to sue,
covenant not to enforce judgment, or similar agreement with
a claimant shall give five days' written notice of such intent
to all other parties and the court. The court may for good
cause authorize a shorter notice period. The notice shall con-
tain a copy of the proposed agreement.'0 2
Because the pro tanto credit in the amount of a reasonable
settlement is a statutory property right that a nonsettling
issues regarding credibility and the perceived forcefulness of witnesses' live
testimony are not central to the making of a reasonableness determination.
Harris; supra note 3, at 126.
101. While the appellate court should be as able as the trial court to rule on the
reasonableness of pre-trial settlements in most instances, a trial judge may be in a
better position to evaluate the reasonableness of a settlement reached during a trial
over which she presides. See Harris, supra note 3, at 601. This was the situation in
Zamora v. Mobil Oil, 104 Wash. 2d 211, 704 P.2d 591 (1985). Where "settlement... [is]
reached well into a hotly contested jury trial and the reasonableness hearing [is]
conducted before the same trial judge-a judge who [is] intimately acquainted with all
aspects of the case and who holds that the settlement [is] a reasonable one," there is
good reason to defer to the trial court. Zamora, 104 Wash. 2d at 223, 704 P.2d at 598
(emphasis added). In this situation, the trial court's experience with courtroom
dynamics-including jury reactions, which cannot appear in the written record-puts
the trial court in a better situation than the appellate court to evaluate the
reasonableness of the settlement. Jury reactions are relevant to the question of which
party is likely to win. If the jury does not seem to be persuaded by the plaintiff's case,
a lower settlement may be appropriate. Only in the limited situation of a mid-trial
settlement, ruled on by the judge presiding over the trial, is there reason to give the
trial court's decision deferential review.
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1987).
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defendant may invoke at a reasonableness hearing, 10 3 the
requirements for notice of that hearing are subject to the
demands of constitutional due process. The United States
Supreme Court has long held that due process requires, at a
minimum, "that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adju-
dication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case."'" The standards by
which sufficiency of notice must be judged appear in Mullane
as well as in many Washington cases:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.... The
notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information . . . and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance ... 05
In other words, the purpose of notice statutes is to apprise
potentially affected parties of the nature and character of an
action in a manner sufficient to allow them to intelligently pre-
pare for the hearing.'l 6
Two aspects of the notice requirements under section
4.22.060(1) of the Revised Code of Washington may offend con-
stitutional due process: (a) the provision for a shorter than five
days' notice period to accommodate eve-of-trial settlements,
and (b) the requirement that the notice contain only a copy of
the settlement agreement.
103. A due process property interest may arise if "there are such rules or
mutually explicit understandings that support (an individual's] claim of entitlement to
the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing." Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs, 96
Wash. 2d 503, 509, 637 P.2d 940, 944 (1981) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
601 (1972)); Danielson v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 788, 796, 742 P.2d 717, 721 (1987).
"While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest . . . it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without
appropriate procedural safeguards." Danielson, 108 Wash. 2d at 795, 742 P.2d at 721
(quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1984)).
104. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306. 313 (1950).
105. Washington case law generally quotes this passage from Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314 (emphasis added and citations omitted). See Barrie v. Kitsap County, 84 Wash. 2d
579, 585, 527 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1974); Olympic Forest Prod. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash.
2d 418, 422, 511 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1973).
106. Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of DuPont, 103 Wash. 2d 720, 727, 696 P.2d 1222,
1226 (1985).
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A. Time of Notice
An expedited hearing, while providing both a convenience
for the settling parties and the encouragement to settle, may
actually interfere with the nonsettling party's ability to effec-
tively challenge reasonableness. With less than five days'
notice, there may not be sufficient time for research and dis-
covery. Harris argues that the minimal notice of an expedited
hearing should not adversely affect a nonsettling party: "With
trial just a few days away, the parties should have all but com-
pleted their necessary discovery and preparation."'1 7  This
argument ignores two important facts. First, while discovery
related to the merits of the case may be substantially complete,
additional discovery may be necessary of both the terms of set-
tlement and the facts behind the Glover factors. In addition,
this additional discovery could yield clues about the collusive-
ness of the settlement. Second, the focus of a reasonableness
hearing is different from the focus of the trial. A shift of
focus, with attendant legal research and materials preparation,
takes time. This is especially true if the summary judgment
model is used, requiring affidavits, depositions, or other
evidence.'0
Not only do research and materials preparation take time,
but the nonsettling defendant will still have the burden of last-
minute trial preparation. Under the statute as written, the
trial judge could, in her discretion, order a reasonableness
hearing with only a few hours' notice to the nonsettling
defendant. 1' 9 Such a short notice period has great potential for
prejudice to the nonsettling defendant. 110 Indeed, even Harris
admits that "[m]eaningful discovery of the opposing party's tes-
timony and evidence cannot be accomplished in [less than five
days].'
The sufficiency of time of notice of a reasonableness hear-
ing was challenged in Zamora v. Mobil Oil."2 In Zamora, the
claim against one of the codefendants was dismissed on sum-
mary judgment, but reinstated on appeal." 3 Trial against the
107. Harris, supra note 3, at 131.
108. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
109. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1987) ("The court may for good cause
authorize a shorter notice period.").
110. But see infra text accompanying notes 124-26.
111. Harris, supra note 3, at 128.
112. 104 Wash. 2d 211, 704 P.2d 591 (1985).
113. Id. at 213, 704 P.2d at 593.
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other codefendants began before reinstatement.114  Several
days into trial, all the remaining codefendants settled, a rea-
sonableness hearing was held, and the settlement was found
reasonable."' The dismissed defendant, Cal Gas, did not
attend the reasonableness hearing, but sought to challenge the
finding of reasonableness after being reinstated with the pro
tanto credit frozen at the settlement amount."16 The nonset-
tling defendant attacked the reasonableness finding by chal-
lenging the sufficiency of notice of the proceeding at which the
finding was made:
[S]ince Cal Gas had neither formal notice of, nor opportunity
to participate in, the reasonableness hearing, that hearing
should not impair Cal Gas' right of contribution.1 17
After finding that Cal Gas was indeed a party to whom
notice was due,""' the court found that Cal Gas had waived its
right to five days' written notice."l 9 Several facts influenced
the court's finding of a waiver. Apparently, Cal Gas had notice
of the reasonableness hearing the morning of the hearing,' °
but chose not to attend because at that time Cal Gas was not a
party to the lawsuit.'12  More importantly, however, settlement
was reached well into a hotly contested jury trial and the
reasonableness hearing was conducted before the same trial
judge - a judge who was intimately acquainted with all
aspects of the case and who held that the settlement was a
reasonable one .... [Tihere is nothing whatsoever in the sit-
uation ... which suggests that the settlement was a "sweet-
heart deal" to the prejudice of the nonsettling [defendant].'M
Waiver of notice was also found in Pickett v. Stephens-Nel-
sen, 23 where the nonsettling defendant challenged the suffi-
ciency of notice (less than five days). As in Zamora,
overwhelming evidence showed that the settlement was non-
collusive and reasonable. Absent collusion, the nonsettling
114. See id. at 223, 704 P.2d at 598.
115. Id. at 213-14, 704 P.2d at 593.
116. See id. at 218-23, 704 P.2d at 595-98.
117. Id. at 220 n.22, 704 P.2d at 597 n.22 (citing Appellant's Opening Brief at 16,
Zamora (No. 51193-4)).
118. Id. at 221-22, 704 P.2d at 597-98.
119. Id. at 223, 704 P.2d at 598.
120. Cal Gas did not challenge the brevity of notice.
121. Id. at 222-23, 704 P.2d at 598.
122. Id. at 223, 704 P.2d at 598.
123. 43 Wash. App. 326, 717 P.2d 277 (1986).
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defendant's actual notice of more than five days, combined
with his failure to object or to ask for additional time, was held
to be a waiver not prejudicial to the nonsettling defendant. 24
The court in Pickett reasoned that waiver of notice may
readily be found in a reasonableness hearing unless the inade-
quate notice proved prejudicial to the defendant. The possibil-
ity of collusion suggests enough potential prejudice for notice
requirements to be taken very seriously. Because the Senate
committee found that the primary function of reasonableness
hearings is collusion-avoidance, more stringent notice require-
ments when collusion is posited are justified.
125
Stricter notice requirements for posited collusion accords
with supreme court dicta on the flexibility of due process:
"The procedural safeguards afforded in each situation should
be tailored to the specific function to be served by them."'2
Because reasonableness hearings exist to block collusive settle-
ments, greater procedural safeguards should be available to a
nonsettling defendant when she has a good faith belief that the
settlement is collusive. These greater safeguards will effectu-
ate the policy behind reasonableness hearings by creating an
opportunity for meaningful exploration of the collusion issue.
B. Notice Documents
The nonsettling defendant's opportunity to prepare mean-
ingful reasonableness hearing arguments is also severely lim-
ited if only the settlement agreement is included with the
notice. A copy of the settling parties' arguments for reasona-
bleness or their proposed findings and conclusions or both
should also be included. Without notice of the settling parties'
arguments for reasonableness, the nonsettling party may have
difficulty structuring effective arguments against it.
This rationale is supported by Seidler v. Hansen, a case
cited in Zamora. The Zamora court refers to Seidler in reach-
ing its conclusion that the five days' notice requirement may be
waived absent prejudice to the defendant. The court applied
by analogy the principles of the five days' notice requirements
of presentation for findings of fact (CR 52(c))" 2 and presenta-
124. Id. at 329-30. 717 P.2d at 279.
125. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 636.
126. Olympic Forest Prod., 82 Wash. 2d at 423, 511 P.2d at 1005.
127. Unless an emergency is shown to exist, or a party has failed to appear to
a hearing or trial, the court shall not sign findings of fact or conclusions of law
until the defeated party or parties have received 5 days' notice of the time and
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tion for judgments (CR 54(f)(2)), 1" set out in Seidler.129 Con-
tinuing the analogy, Seidler also indicates what documents
must be included for sufficient notice under CR 52 and CR 54.
In Seidler, the plaintiff complained of defendant's failure
to include a copy of proposed findings and conclusions under
CR 54(f)(2)." a  The court found CR 52(c) the more apt rule,
but agreed that
[n]otice of presentation would be of small value to a defeated
party without also having notice of the contents of the pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, in order to
have time to evaluate them and prepare argument against
their adoption. Any other construction of the rule would be
unreasonable and we must conclude that the 5-day notice
requirement applies both to notice of submission and to ser-
vice on the adverse party of copies of the proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law. 131
According to the Zamora court, the principles of notice under
CR 52(c) and CR 54(f)(2) apply to notice under section
4.22.060(1) of the Revised Code of Washington. 32 The effect of
this holding is that notice of a reasonableness hearing, in order
to be sufficient, must include not only a copy of the settlement
agreement, but also a copy of either a document in which the
party asserting reasonableness presents the arguments sup-
porting reasonableness or the proposed findings and conclu-
sions, or any document that will inform the nonsettling party
of the proponent's perspective. This would enable the nonset-
place of the submission, and have been served with copies of the proposed
findings and conclusions.
WASH. R. CIv. P. 52(c).
128. No order or judgment shall be signed or entered until opposing counsel
have been given 5 days' notice of presentation and served with a copy of the
proposed order or judgment ....
WASH. R. Civ. P. 54(f)(2).
129. Zamora, 104 Wash. 2d at 222 n.27, 704 P.2d at 598 n.27 (citing Seidler v.
Hansen, 14 Wash. App. 915, 547 P.2d 917 (1976)).
130. Seidler, 14 Wash. App. at 918-19, 547 P.2d at 920.
131. Id. at 919, 547 P.2d at 920.
132. The 5-day written notice to parties requirement of the statute, [WASH.
REV. CODE) 4.22.060(1) (1987), is much the same as the requirement for a 5-day
notice of presentation for findings of fact (CR 52(c)) and the 5-day notice of
presentation for judgments (CR 54(f)(2)). Under these latter two rules, 5 days'
notice is required unless a party in some manner waives such notice or the
trial court for cause shown shortens the time-providing that, in either event.
no prejudice ensues. By analogy, we hold that these same principles should be
applicable to the situation before us.
Zamora. 104 Wash. 2d at 222, 704 P.2d at 598.
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tling party to "intelligently prepare for the hearing"'" and to
be afforded an opportunity to present objections. 1'
C. Procedural Protections v. Eve-of-Trial Settlements
In addition to asserting that nonsettling defendants do not
need procedural protections in expedited eve-of-trial settle-
ments because they will already have completed discovery,
Harris argues that "postponing the reasonableness hearing
until during or after the trial was expressly rejected in
Glover."' The dictum to which Harris refers arose in the
context of the Glover court's rejection of the nonsettling
defendant's argument that relative liability should be the
determinant of reasonableness.13 The court considered the
possibility of postponing the reasonableness determination
pending the resolution of the relative liability issue at trial. 37
The court pointed out that this solution would deprive plain-
tiffs of certainty at the start of trial about the amount by
which any later judgment would be offset."3
Plaintiffs would be deprived of certainty if they accepted a
partial eve-of-trial settlement, whether the reasonableness
determination depended on the outcome of the trial or on a
hearing continued into the trial time to benefit the nonsettling
defendant. However, the plaintiff has the ultimate say on set-
tlements-it is the plaintiff who accepts a defendant's offer.
While procedural protections for a nonsettling defendant may
discourage plaintiffs from accepting an eve-of-trial settlement,
there is no reason why these procedures should discourage set-
tlements before or after the eve of trial. Perhaps a plaintiff
threatened by the uncertainty of a partial eve-of-trial settle-
ment would be encouraged to seek full settlement on the eve
of trial. Procedural protections for defendants in eve-of-trial
settlements may discourage partial settlements on the eve of
trial, and thus may run counter to the policy of encouraging
settlements. However, this small loss is more than balanced by
the gain of a meaningful reasonableness hearing and respect
for due process.
133. See also Nisqually, 103 Wash. 2d at 727, 696 P.2d at 1226; Barrie, 84 Wash. 2d
at 585, 527 P.2d at 1380.
134. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Barrie, 84 Wash. 2d at 585, 527 P.2d at 1381.
135. Harris, supra note 3, at 128.





Appellate courts are sensitive to the tension that exists
between encouraging settlement and avoiding collusion when a
reasonableness hearing is challenged on procedural grounds.
Probably correctly, they favor the policy of encouraging settle-
ment by showing a reluctance to overturn a finding of reasona-
bleness on procedural grounds absent an allegation of
collusion. The reverse side of this coin is that where good faith
allegations of collusion exist, the courts would violate legisla-
tive intent by finding a waiver of procedural rights. At the
trial court level, a motion for reconsideration of a reasonable-
ness finding should be allowed under CR 59(a)(1) where proce-
dural deficiencies exist, and Where there is evidence of
collusion that may not have been thoroughly presented at the
initial hearing because of those procedural deficiencies.'39
IV. REMEDIES FOR COLLUSION
The Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that a
threshold ruling on collusion be made at a reasonableness
hearing.'O While a threshold ruling on collusion may be logi-
cal since reasonableness hearings purportedly exist to avoid
collusion, a ruling on collusion is not yet mandated by law.
Section 4.22.060(1) of the Revised Code of Washington requires
only a finding that the settlement amount is reasonable. In
Glover, the court acknowledged that a trial court may find col-
lusion if the nonsettling defendant presents evidence of collu-
sion. 141  When such a determination is made, however, the
question arises as to what remedy a non-settling defendant
should seek.
If evidence of collusion is presented at a reasonableness
hearing and the court makes no finding about collusion but
instead approves the settlement, then arguably reconsideration
should be granted under CR 59(a)(1), 142 which allows for
reconsideration when there has been a procedural error. This
139. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
140. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 5.
141. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 716 n.2, 658 P.2d at 1235 n.2 (if the non-settling
defendant presents evidence of collusion, the judge may refuse to approve the
settlement pursuant to her inherent authority).
142. (a) GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION. The verdict or other
decision may be vacated and a new trial granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues when such issues are clearly and fairly
separable and distinct, on the motion of the party aggrieved for any one of the
following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of such parties:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or
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result is dictated by the collusion-avoidance function for which
reasonableness hearings were formed.
The supreme court, in both cases in which it considered
reasonableness rulings, mentioned lack of bad faith or collu-
sion as a reason to not reverse a finding of reasonableness. 43
It follows that evidence of collusion, either ignored by the
court in the initial hearing, or surfacing subsequently, justifies
reconsideration and possibly reversal of the reasonableness
ruling.
Evidence of collusive settlement emerging after the rea-
sonableness hearing is relevant for two related reasons: (1) evi-
dence of collusion will probably be hidden and difficult to
discover, and (2) collusive settlement terms may be withheld
from the reasonableness hearing, but later become apparent at
trial.
Once collusion is established, there is the problem of an
appropriate remedy. Three possible remedies suggest them-
selves. The trial judge could (1) fail to approve the settlement,
so making it void; (2) accept the settlement, but not extinguish
the nonsettling defendant's right to contribution from the set-
tling defendant; or (3) accept the settlement, but fix a reason-
able figure for a noncollusive settlement to be used as a pro
tanto credit.
The first remedy, failure to approve the settlement, is
advocated by the Glover court.'" Once the possibility exists
that a settlement may not be approved and may therefore not
bind the parties, an element of certainty will be removed from
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by which such party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
WASH. R. Civ. PRoc. 59(a)(1).
Requirements justifying a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are
firmly established:
(a) the new evidence will probably change the result if a new trial is granted;
(b) the evidence must have been discovered since the trial;
(c) the evidence must not have been susceptible to discovery before the trial;
(d) the evidence must be material to the issue; and
(e) the evidence must not be merely cumulative.
Hill v. L.W. Weident Farms, Inc., 75 Wash. 2d 871, 875, 454 P.2d 220, 223-24 (1969) (cit-
ing Nelson v. Placanica, 33 Wash. 2d 523, 206 P.2d 296 (1948)).
It remains to be seen whether these requirements will apply to evidence of collu-
sive settlement that surfaces after a reasonableness hearing, and if they apply, in what
manner.
143. Zamora, 104 Wash. 2d at 223, 704 P.2d at 598; Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 718, 658
P.2d at 1236.
144. See Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 716 n.2, 658 P.2d at 1235 n.2.
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settlements. If we accept the argument that the carrot of cer-
tainty entices settlements, then removing that carrot will dis-
courage settlements, or at least not encourage them. To
discourage settlements by limiting certainty seems to be at
odds with legislative policy. 45
The Glover court and the Judiciary Committee apparently
based their suggested remedy on the assumption that the collu-
sion ruling will be made at a reasonableness hearing prior to
the nonsettling defendant's trial. If instead the collusion rul-
ing occurs during or after the trial of the nonsettling defend-
ant, then if the settlement is not approved it must be
renegotiated or the case must be tried over against the settling
defendant.
This remedy punishes all the parties. The plaintiff and
settling defendant lose certainty and gain the expense of rene-
gotiation or trial. The nonsettling defendant will lose the cer-
tainty of an early pro tanto credit. If the settlement cannot be
renegotiated, she may also have to incur the expense of a trial
on the issue of contribution because the right of contribution
will again exist between the defendants.'" Comparative fault
governs the right of contribution under-section 4.22.040(1) of
the Revised Code of Washington. So unless the settlement is
voided in time to simultaneously bring all defendants to trial,
the defendant who first goes to trial must participate in the
subsequent trial of the other defendant, or bring a separate
contribution action so that the matter of comparative fault is
fairly tried. The courts, as well as the parties, may lose under
this remedy. Their loss will be the burden of avoidable
litigation.
The second remedy, letting the settlement bind the parties
to it without extinguishing the nonsettling defendant's right to
contribution, is suggested by Harris, analogizing to CR 56(g). 47
Under CR 56(g), an affidavit is always subject to scrutiny for
good faith. 148 Applying the rule of CR 56(g) to reasonableness
145. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 (1987).
147. See Harris, supra note 3, at 185 for a proposed court rule addressing this
point, modeled after CR 56(g).
148. (g) AFFIDAVITS MADE IN BAD FAITH. Should it appear to the satisfaction
of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
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hearings, a finding of bad faith or collusion in the settlement,
or in the affidavits supporting reasonableness, would require
the party acting collusively or in bad faith to reimburse the
other party for any expenses it incurred because of the bad
faith or collusion.149 If this suggested rule were read as main-
taining the nonsettling defendant's right to contribution,"s the
bad faith plaintiff would get his full recovery, while the bad
faith defendant would lose the certainty of his settlement. All
defendants would have to incur the costs of a trial to deter-
mine comparative fault. However, if this rule were read as
requiring contribution by all settling parties, then depending
on when in the course of payment of the judgment the ruling
occurred, the plaintiff might be liable to the nonsettling party
for either partial reimbursement or for a credit against his por-
tion of the judgment.
This second remedy, while it punishes all the bad faith
parties, is awkward because the comparative fault issue would
still need to be tried, and the plaintiff's share of the nonset-
ting defendant's costs would need to be fixed as well. If the
collusion affects the nonsettling defendant's trial, the nonset-
ting defendant may not have to pay any judgment at all
because improper disclosures to the plaintiff may forever fore-
close the possibility of a fair trial.
The third remedy is the simplest. It lets the settlement
bind the parties as prescribed by section 4.22.060(3) of the
Revised Code of Washington but lets the court fix the amount
of the pro tanto credit based on a reasonable, noncollusive set-
tlement or, if occurring after trial, based on the judgment.
Under this remedy, the collusive defendant keeps the certainty
of his settlement while the plaintiff is punished with less than
a full recovery, assuming a verdict disproportionately higher
than the settlement. While this remedy creates uncertainty for
plaintiffs, and thus could discourage them from settling, a
plaintiff has full control over an accepted settlement. The
plaintiff could avoid any uncertainties by scrupulously avoiding
even the appearance of collusion.
The tension between avoiding collusion and encouraging
him to incur, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
WASH. R_ CIrv. P. 56(g).
149. Harris, supra note 3, at 185.
150. In other words, the amount of the judgment in excess of comparative fault
equals expense incurred as a result of collusion.
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settlement is very real. By allowing a remedy against collusion,
but by setting a high standard of proof for collusion, 51 a
proper balance might be struck. The remedy chosen should
not discourage settlement because courts, with an interest in
settlements, would be reluctant to use it.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A REASONABLENESS
HEARING AND THE NONSETTLING DEFENDANT'S
SUBSEQUENT TRIAL
Important questions about the reasonableness hearing
arise in the context of the nonsettling defendant's subsequent
trial. These questions concern the admissibility of the reasona-
bleness proceedings and ruling as evidence in that trial. They
arise because plaintiff's interest in presenting the amount of
damages may change between the reasonableness hearing and
trial.
At the reasonableness hearing, the plaintiff will probably
claim damages on the low side to make the amount of settle-
ment look reasonable. At trial, on the other hand, the plaintiff
will have an incentive to claim higher damages to maximize
recovery, and may obtain a judgment that appears excessive
when compared to the reasonableness hearing figures. When
settlement occurs early in the lawsuit and discovery is incom-
plete, a later increase in the amount of damages sought may be
acceptable because evidence discovered during preparation for
trial may show a personal injury plaintiff's damages to be
greater than originally represented.152
While an increase in the damage figure at trial may be jus-
tified for a personal injury plaintiff who settles early with less
than all of the defendants, the plaintiff who accepts a settle-
ment on the eve of trial may be motivated only by greed. By
the eve of trial, the plaintiff should have a firm idea of her
damages. Absent an abrupt change in the law, the only reason
to change the damage figure would be to gamble for a higher
recovery. This gamble is at the nonsettling defendant's
expense.
151. An allegation of collusion is essentially an allegation of fraud. The standard
of proof for fraud is "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence. Beckendorf v.
Beckendorf, 76 Wash. 2d 457, 462, 457 P.2d 603, 606 (1969). Therefore, a nonsettling
defendant who seeks to prove collusion should be prepared to do so by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence.
152. The Glover factor relating to extent of preparation addresses these
circumstances. Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 717, 658 P.2d at 1237.
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A settlement is found reasonable partly because of its rela-
tionship to the amount of damages sought."53 If the plaintiff
uses a lower damage figure at the reasonableness hearing, a
nonsettling defendant is deprived of the oppoitunity to argue
that the settlement amount is too low as a percentage of the
damages claimed.
The problem of shifting damage figures arises because of
the intangible nature of compensatory damages'T 5 and because
state law forbids specifying the amount of damages sought.'55
Rather, the statute requires "a prayer for damages as shall be
determined. '"1s6 However, the statute also requires plaintiffs to
provide defendants with statements of damages sought within
15 days of a formal request by defendants.'57
Defendants must be able to rely on the amount of damages
that plaintiff claims to seek. That figure guides the defendants'
strategy in litigation and settlement negotiations as well as in
.arguments about the reasonableness of a codefendant's
settlement.
Nonsettling defendants may be protected from shifting
damage figures and the purposes of reasonableness hearings
may be furthered by the remedy of equitable estoppel.ss The
elements for equitable estoppel are:
(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the
claim afterward asserted; (2) action by the other party on
the faith of such admission, statement, or act; and (3) injury
to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act.
15 9
Where a plaintiff claims to seek damages in a lower
amount for purposes of a reasonableness hearing, especially on
153. Id; see supra text accompanying note 47.
154. Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 96 Wash. 2d 692, 700, 635 P.2d 441, 444-45
(1981) (compensatory damages are intended to compensate for tangible injuries, such
as property damage, and for such intangible injuries as pain and suffering or loss of
reputation); Baxter v. Greyhound Corp., 65 Wash. 2d 421, 438, 397 P.2d 857, 868 (1964);
Walker v. McNeill, 17 Wash. 582, 593-94, 50 P. 518, 521-22 (1897).
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.360 (1987).
156. id.
157. Id.
158. The doctrine of equitable estoppel rests on the principle that "a party should
be held to a representation made or position assumed where inequitable consequences
would otherwise result to another party who has justifiably and in good faith relied
thereon." Emrich v. Connell, 105 Wash. 2d 551, 559. 716 P.2d 863, 868 (1986) (quoting
Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 85 Wash. 2d 78, 81, 530 P.2d 298, 300 (1975)).
159. Emrich, 105 Wash. 2d .at 559, 716 P.2d at 868.
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the eve of trial, and then at trial seeks a higher amount, all
three elements for estoppel are present. Element (1) is present
when the plaintiff's damage claim ("statement") at the reason-
ableness hearing, and presumably during settlement negotia-
tions, is inconsistent with the claim at trial. Element (2) is
present when the nonsettling defendant relies on the plain-
tiff's damage claim to structure settlement offers and to argue
against the reasonableness of any settlement with a codefend-
ant. The court also relies on the plaintiff's statement in mak-
ing the reasonableness ruling. Element (3) is present when a
settlement is found to be reasonable based on the lower
amount, and the defendant is deprived of the possibility of a
higher pro tanto credit. The court is harmed because it is used
by the plaintiff for ignoble ends and thereby loses a measure of
dignity and credibility. When there is no good faith reason for
the plaintiff to assert a claim for damages at trial that is signif-
icantly higher than the amount proved at a reasonableness
hearing, the plaintiff should be estopped from asserting that
claim. The estoppel remedy could be implemented through a
court rule that prohibited the assertion of significantly higher
damages absent good cause, or through a jury instruction plac-
ing a ceiling on damages.
However, any attempt to claim that the plaintiff is
estopped from asking for a higher damage award would have
to take into account ER 408, which excludes evidence of settle-
ment to prove the amount of a claim."8 ER 408 is based on the
assumption that evidence of settlement or offers of compro-
mise is not relevant to the issues of liability or damages.' Its
purpose is to protect a defendant whose offer of settlement is
rejected from having that offer used at trial as an admission of
160. COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE. Evidence of (1) furnishing
or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising
to accept a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct
a criminal investigation or prosecution.
WASH. R. EVID. 408 (emphasis added).
161. K. TEGLAND, 5 WASH. PRAC. EvIDENCE § 134 (2d ed. 1982).
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liability or of the amount of damages due the plaintiff."l 2 How-
ever, the rule also protects the plaintiff from use of such evi-
dence to prove "the invalidity of the claim.""z  Neither of
these purposes of ER 408 is violated by using evidence of asser-
tions made at reasonableness hearings to establish a ceiling for
damages at the nonsettling defendant's subsequent trial. How-
ever, there are several conceptual frameworks for estopping a
plaintiff from inflating her suggested damage amount that
avoid using reasonableness hearing assertions as evidence.
Each framework relies on jury instructions to effectuate the
estoppel.
The first framework is based on the fact that equitable
remedies are granted by the judge, not by the jury.'" There-
fore, a defendant could move for estoppel, and the motion
would be argued only to the judge. The arguments would be
made out of the presence of the jury, and if the motion was
denied, neither party would have been prejudiced by the
admission of evidence of the settlement figure or by the
amount of damages claimed as a basis for the reasonableness of
the settlement figure. On the other hand, if the judge decided
that the plaintiff should be estopped from seeking a higher
damage award, the arguments and evidence supporting this
motion1 " would still not be revealed to the jury. The estoppel
would be implemented by incorporating the amount or range
of damages claimed at the reasonableness hearing into jury
instructions as a ceiling on any jury award.
Summary judgment procedure also provides a second
framework for estoppel that would be consistent with the pol-
icy underlying ER 408. Under CR 56(d), the court may grant
partial summary judgment, specifying in its order the facts not
in dispute, "including the extent to which the amount of dam-
ages or other relief is not in controversy."'" The rule provides
that any such facts not in dispute at the summary judgment
proceeding "shall be deemed established" for the purpose of
162. Id. at 331 (comment WASH. R. EvID. 408).
163. WASH. R. EvID. 408.
164. In re Estate of Shaughnessy, 97 Wash. 2d 652, 657, 648 P.2d 427, 430 (1982).
165. This evidence would include the fact of the plaintiff's settlement with the
codefendant as well as the amount of settlement, both of which are inadmissible under
ER 408. Grigsby v. Seattle, 12 Wash. App. 453, 458, 529 P.2d 1167, 1171 (1975) (in
personal injury action, revelation that plaintiff had settled with a codefendant was
error). The scope of ER 408 is broad enough to extend beyond the parties at trial. See
K. TEcLAND, 5 WASH. PRAC. EVIDENCE § 134 (2d ed. 1982).
166. WASH. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
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any upcoming trial. 67
If a determination of reasonableness is equated with a par-
tial summary judgment"6 then the maximum damage figure
asserted by the plaintiff at a reasonableness hearing could be
considered a fact "deemed established" for trial as a ceiling on
any damage award. This would give the plaintiff no flexibility
in adjusting a damage claim upward at trial. However, it may
be unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to conclusively estab-
lish her damages, or range of damages, before attempting to
settle with any defendants, in order to avoid being held to a
low damage figure at trial. On the other hand, this expectation
might force plaintiffs to err on the side of projecting a higher
total damage figure at the reasonableness hearing, thus
counteracting any tendency to minimize damages in order to
push the settlement through.
Naturally, a plaintiff who settles long before trial should
be entitled to a reconsideration of the ceiling on damages if she
can present evidence of higher damages that could not have
been discovered with reasonable diligence before the reasona-
bleness hearing.
The rebuttable presumption supplies a third framework
for estoppel: the maximum damages asserted at the reasona-
bleness hearing become a presumptively correct ceiling. At
trial, in addition to proving the fact and amount of damages,
the plaintiff must prove that figures higher than those asserted
at the reasonableness hearing are justified on the basis of evi-
dence that could not have been discovered with reasonable dili-
gence before the reasonableness hearing. The closer to the
time of trial a settlement and reasonableness hearing occur,
the more difficult it will be for a plaintiff to show new evi-
dence justifying higher damages.
The second and third frameworks are substantially simi-
lar. While they may provide satisfying conceptualizations for
attorneys and judges, it may be difficult to develop understand-
able jury instructions to implement them. On the other hand,
the first framework would produce an elegantly simple
instruction: "The jury may not award damages greater than
$_______
167. Id.
168. A determination of reasonableness of a settlement is similar to a partial
summary judgment as to the settling defendant.
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CONCLUSION
Reasonableness hearings exist primarily to benefit nonset-
tling defendants. Procedures developed for the hearings
should effectuate this purpose. To that end, nonsettling
defendants must have adequate temporal and documentary
notice of reasonableness hearings in order to discover and pre-
pare evidence challenging the settling parties' assertion of rea-
sonableness. Trial courts should consider the factors for
reasonableness set out by the supreme court, and should artic-
ulate the bases for their judgments so that coherent standards
of reasonableness may be developed through appellate review.
Trial courts should also be prepared to protect the nonsettling
defendant's interests by providing remedies against collusive
settlements and by prohibiting the assertion of a damage claim
at trial that is unjustifiably higher than the amount asserted at
the reasonableness hearing.
Luanne Coachman
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